Rational expectations assumes perfect, model consistency between beliefs and market realizations. Here we discuss behaviorally rational expectations, characterized by an observable, parsimonious and intuitive form of consistency between beliefs and realizations. We discuss three case-studies. Firstly, a New Keynesian macro model with a representative agent learning an optimal, but misspecified, AR(1) rule to forecast inflation consistent with observed sample mean and first-order autocorrelations. Secondly, an asset pricing model with heterogeneous expectations and agents switching between a mean-reverting fundamental rule and a trend-following rule, based upon their past performance. The third example concerns learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments, where under positive feedback individuals coordinate expectations on non-rational, almost self-fulfilling equilibria with persistent price fluctuations very different from rational equilibria.
Introduction
Traditional economics is built on the rationality paradigm. All agents are assumed to be perfectly rational, using all available information and rationality is common knowledge. In a perfect rational world, the population of agents is represented by a perfectly rational representative agent, markets are in equilibrium and as a result markets are efficient and prices reflect economic fundamentals. Agents have rational expectations (RE), that is, expectations are model consistent, so that beliefs and market realizations, on average, coincide optimally. The rational expectation hypothesis (REH, Muth, 1961 , Lucas, 1972 is the cornerstone of new classical economic and financial analysis.
Behavioral economics and finance are gaining ground however and many systematic deviations from rationality -behavioral biases-have been documented, e.g., hyperbolic discounting, money illusion, ambiguity effect, loss aversion, status quo bias, survivorship bias, etc. Some possible biases in expectation formation that have been discussed in the literature include belief bias, anchoring, bandwagon effect, (Bayesian) conservatism, exaggerated expectations, optimistic or pessimistic beliefs and overconfidence. In this paper we discuss a behavioral theory of expectations, replacing perfect model consistency by observable, more intuitive and parsimonious consistency requirements between beliefs and realizations.
Much work has been done on boundedly rational expectations and adaptive learning (Sargent, 1993) . Boundedly rational agents act as econometricians or statisticians using an econometric forecasting model and updating the parameters over time as additional observations become available; see, e.g., Honkapohja (2001, 2013) and Bullard (2006) for extensive surveys and references. Part of this literature involves studying under which conditions learning will converge to the rational expectations equilibrium (REE). Another part of the literature studies non-rational learning equilibria, explaining excess volatility, as e.g. in Bullard (1994) , Hommes and Sorger (1998) , Hommes and Rosser (2001) and Adam and Marcet (2011) . This paper puts forth the notion of behaviorally rational expectations. While adaptive learning has stressed a statistical approach to expectations and forecasts, we stress simplicity, parsimony and an intuitive behavioral interpretation. Agents base their expectations on simple forecasting heuristics, with the class of forecasting rules disciplined by behavioral consistency between beliefs and market realizations. Hence, we back off from perfect rational expectations and model consistency, but impose a reasonable degree of observational consistencies between beliefs and realizations.
Aggregate behavior is then characterized by almost self-fulfilling behavioral learning equilibria. A rational expectations equilibrium may arise as a special case in which the equilibrium is perfectly self-fulfilling, but typically behavioral learning equilibria exhibit excess volatility and may persistently deviate from the rational benchmark.
Our approach is similar in spirit to the concepts of natural expectations (Fuster et al., 2010 ; Beshears et al., 2013) and smart heuristics and the adaptive toolbox (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001) . A key difference however is that we impose plausible consistency requirements between beliefs and realizations.
We discuss the concept of behavioral rationality through three case studies; more examples may be found in Hommes (2013) . The first is in macroeconomics, a New Keynesian Philips curve (NKPC) with a representative agent learning the simplest, but misspecified, univariate AR(1) rule to forecast future inflation in an economy that is too complex to fully understand (Hommes and Zhu, 2013) . The parameters of the AR(1) rule are pinned down by simple and intuitive consistency requirements: the mean and the first-order autocorrelation of the AR(1) forecasting rule coincide with the realizations. The representative agent does not fully understand the complex economy, but makes a mistake believing that the true economy follows an AR (1) process. This mistake becomes self-fulfilling (Grandmont, 1998 ) -in terms of the sample average and first order sample autocorrelation-when the agent learns the optimal parameters of the simple univariate rule.
The second case study is an asset pricing model with heterogeneous expectations and agents choosing between a mean-reverting fundamental rule and a trend-following rule (Boswijk et al., 2007; Hommes and in't Veld, 2013) . Switching between strategies is endogenous, based upon the relative past performance of the rules. Hence, agents believe that the market may switch between a mean-reverting and an explosive phase and this belief becomes self-fulfilling when switching behavior is driven by profitability.
The third example concerns learning-to-forecast laboratory experiments in positive and negative feedback systems (Bao et al., 2012) . Negative feedback systems are rather stable and individuals quite easily learn to coordinate on the perfectly self-fulfilling REE. In contrast, under positive feedback almost self-fulfilling equilibria arise in the laboratory markets.
A common finding is that in positive feedback markets aggregate behavior is not well described by perfectly self-fulfilling rational equilibrium. Instead, individuals coordinate their expectations on almost self-fulfilling equilibria, very different from exact self-fulfilling equilibria, with excess volatility and persistent price fluctuations deviating significantly from perfect rationality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the New Keynesian Philips curve with a representative behaviorally rational agent. Section 3 discusses an asset pricing model with fundamentalists versus trend-extrapolators. Section 4 discusses individual and aggregate behavior in laboratory experiments under positive and negative feedback. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
A New Keynesian Philips curve
We consider the New Keynesian Philips curve (NKPC) with inflation driven by an exogenous AR(1) process y t for the firm's real marginal cost or the output gap. Inflation and the output gap (real marginal cost) evolve according to (e.g. Woodford,
where π t is the inflation at time t, π e t+1 is the subjective expected inflation at date t+1 and y t is the output gap or real marginal cost, δ ∈ [0, 1) is the representative agent's subjective time discount factor, γ > 0 is related to the degree of price stickiness in the economy and ρ ∈ [0, 1) describes the persistence of the AR(1) driving process. u t and ε t are i.i.d. stochastic disturbances with zero mean and finite absolute moments with variances σ 2 u and σ 2 ε , respectively. We refer to u t as a markup shock, which is often motivated by the presence of an uncertain, variable tax rate and to ε t as a demand shock, that is uncorrelated with the markup shock.
Agents are boundedly rational and do not know the exact form of the actual law of motion (1) . As in Hommes and Zhu (2013), we assume that agents do not recognize that inflation π t is driven by an exogenous stochastic process y t for marginal costs or output gap. Although agents may observe y t they do not realize or they do not believe that the state of the economy is determined by the exogenous process y t . Instead agents only use past observations π t−1 , π t−2 , · · · , and a simple linear model to forecast the future state of the economy (i.e. inflation), whose structure and complexity they do not fully understand. We focus on the simplest case where agents' perceived law of motion (PLM) is a simple, parsimonious univariate AR(1) process. Hommes and Zhu (2013) follow the idea of a self-fulfilling mistake (Grandmont, 1998) imposing consistency requirements on the parameters of the AR(1) rule, as explained below, so that the mistake becomes self-fulfilling.
If agents believe that inflation π t follows a univariate AR(1) process, and try to learn its parameters α and β, the implied actual law of motion (ALM) becomes
We assume that agents use sample autocorrelation learning (SAC-learning; Hommes and Sorger, 1998) to learn the parameters α and β. That is, for any finite set of observations {π 0 , π 1 , · · · , x t }, the sample average is given by
and the first-order sample autocorrelation coefficient is given by
Hence α t and β t are updated over time as new information arrives. SAC-learning has a simple behavioral interpretation, since the sample average and first order autocorrelation coefficient -the persistence of a time series-may be "guestimated" from an observed time series.
A first-order Stochastic Consistent Expectations Equilibrium (SCEE) (α * , β * ) is an equilibrium for which the mean and first-order autocorrelation of the implied actual law of motion (2) exactly coincide with α * and β * respectively. Hommes and Zhu (2013) prove the following proposition:
Proposition. In the case that 0 < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1, there exists at least one nonzero first-order stochastic consistent expectations equilibrium (SCEE) (α * , β * ) for the New Keynesian Philips curve (2) 
The sample mean α * = γa (1−δ)(1−ρ) = π * exactly coincides with the RE sample mean, and therefore along a SCEE inflation is unbiased in the long run. The inflation persistence, as measured by the first-order autocorrelation β * is typically much larger than the RE persistence (which equals ρ, the autocorrelation of the exogenous driving force). Moreover, Hommes and Zhu (2013) show that for the New Keynesian Philips curve (1) multiple SCEE may coexist. Coexistence of multiple SCEE is illustrated in Figure 1 . The first-order autocorrelation coefficient F (β) of the implied ALM (2) is given by Figure 1a illustrates that, for empirically plausible parameter values, F (β) has three fixed points β * 1 ≈ 0.3066, β * 2 ≈ 0.7417 and β * 3 ≈ 0.9961. Hence, we have coexistence of three first-order SCEE (α * , β * ). Figures 1b and 1c illustrate the time series of inflation along the coexisting SCEE. Inflation has low persistence along the SCEE (α * , β * 1 ), but very high persistence along the SCEE (α * , β * 3 ). The time series of inflation along the high persistence SCEE in Figure 1c has in fact similar persistence characteristics and amplitude of fluctuation as in empirical U.S. inflation data.
Furthermore, Figure 1c illustrates that inflation in the high persistence SCEE has much stronger persistence than REE inflation, where the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of REE inflation equals ρ = 0.9, significantly less than β * 3 = 0.9961. Figure 2 illustrates the inflation dynamics in the Keynesian Philips curve under constant gain SAC-learning 1 . In the case of multiple equilibria, time-varying parameter estimates make it possible that a sequence of shocks moves the economy from one equilibrium to another. As shown in Branch and Evans (2010), a real-time constant gain learning formulation in an asset pricing model is capable of reproducing regime-switching asset returns and volatilities. Figure 2 illustrates these switches between different basins of attraction, where other parameters are taken as in Figure 1 .
The inflation π t clearly exhibits regime switching, with the autocorrelation coefficient β t switching between phases of high persistence with near unit root behaviour and phases of low persistence with close to 0 autocorrelation and the variance estimator
switching between phases of high and low volatility.
This simple example illustrates the occurrence of almost self-fulfilling equilibria, with behaviorally rational expectations, in a representative agent framework. The first-order autocorrelation coefficient β t , switching between high and low persistence;
Bottom panel: variance estimator R t switching between high and low volatility.
representative agent makes a mistake and does not fully recognize the complex structure of the economy. Instead, the agent uses the simples univariate AR(1) forecasting rule. By learning, the mistake becomes self-fulfilling in terms of the two most important observable statistics, the sample average and first-order autocorrelation, which may also be "guestimated" from observed time series.
A behavioral asset pricing model
We consider a stylized yet microfounded asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs and the estimation of a 2-type model on S&P500 data. A detailed derivation may be found in Brock and Hommes (1998) . Investors can choose between a risk free asset paying a fixed return r and a risky asset (say a stock) paying stochastic dividends. We assume that investors have perfect knowledge of the exogenous cash flow process, and thus know the 'fundamental value' of the risky asset, but differ in their beliefs about the price of the asset in the short run. Denote Y t as the dividend payoff, P t as the asset price and z h,t as the number of shares bought by investor i.
Wealth in period t + 1 for trader type h is given by
Let E h,t and V h,t denote the "beliefs" or forecasts of trader type h about conditional expectation and conditional variance. Agents are assumed to be myopic mean-variance maximizers so that the demand z h,t of type h is
where a is the risk aversion and, for simplicity, the conditional variance V h,t = σ 2 is assumed to be equal and constant for all types. In the case of zero supply of outside shares the market clearing price is given by
where n h,t denotes the time-varying fraction of trader type h and E h,
denotes the beliefs about the future price and the future dividend by investor type h.
The dividend process follows a geometric random walk with drift: In the special case where all agents have rational expectations about prices, the price equals its RE fundamental value given by the discounted sum of all future expected dividends 2 :
Hence, under RE the price-to-dividend ratio is constant and given by In deviations from the fundamental value x t ≡ δ t − δ * , the 2-type model can be rewritten as:
Notice that the asset pricing model has positive expectations feedback, that is, realized price deviation increases (decreases) when (average) expected deviation increases (decreases). The simplest form of heterogeneity occurs when belief types are linear in the last observation: Two types, h = 1, 2, are sufficient to capture the essential difference in agents' behavior: fundamentalists believe the price will return to its fundamental value (0 ≤ φ 1 < 1) and chartists believe that the price (in the short run) will move away from the fundamental value (φ 2 > 1).
The fractions of the two types are updated with a multinomial logit model as in Brock and Hommes (1997) , with intensity of choice β:
The performance measure U h,t is a weighted average of past profits π h,t and past fitness U h,t−1 , with memory parameter ω:
with profits, up to a constant factor, given by
where R * = (1 + r)/(1 + g). The econometric form of the endogenous strategy switching model is an AR(1)-model with a time-varying coefficient:
where t is an i.i.d. error term. Combining equations (15), (16) and (17), fractions depend nonlinearly on past realisations:
The estimated parameter values in Hommes and in't Veld (2013) are: • φ 1 = 0.953: type 1 therefore are fundamentalists, expecting mean reversion of the price towards its fundamental value;
• φ 2 = 1.035: type 2 are trend extrapolators, expecting the price deviation from fundamental to increase by 3.5% per quarter;
• ω = 0.816: implying almost 20% weight is given to the most recent profit observation and about 80% to past profitability.
Define the market sentiment as During the dot com bubble the market sentiment φ t exceeds 1 for several quarters and therefore the market is temporarily explosive. During the financial crisis the market is mainly dominated by fundamentalists indicating that the financial crisis has been reenforced by fundamentalists who expected a correction of asset prices back to fundamentals.
In this behavioral asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs, agents switch between a mean-reversion and a trend-following strategy based upon realized profitability. Strategy switching driven by profitability leads to an almost self-fulfilling equilibrium with bubbles and crashes triggered by shocks ("news") to economic fundamentals amplified by endogenous switching between trend-following and fundamentalist's strategies.
In this section we consider Learning-to-Forecast Experiments (LtFE) with human subjects; a survey of these experiments is given in Hommes (2011) . Subjects have to forecast a price, whose realization depends endogenously on their average forecast. The main goal of these experiments is to study how individual expectations are formed, how these interact and which structure emerges at the aggregate level.
Will agents coordinate on a common forecast and will the price converge to the rational expectations benchmark or will other, almost self-fulfilling behaviorally rational Laboratory experiments are well suited to study correlation of individual expectations in a controlled environment. It turns out that the type of expectations feedback, positive or negative, is crucial. In the case of positive (negative) feedback, an increase (decrease) of the average forecast, causes the realized market price to rise (fall). Positive feedback seems particularly relevant in speculative asset markets. If many agents expect the price of an asset to rise they will start buying the asset, aggregate demand will increase and so, by the law of supply and demand, the asset price will increase.
High price expectations then become self-fulfilling leading to high realized asset prices.
In markets where the role of speculative demand is less important, e.g. in markets for non-storable commodities, negative feedback may play a more prominent role.
For example in a supply-driven commodity market, if many producers expect future prices to be high they will increase production which, according to the law of supply and demand, will lead to a lower realized market price. 
where t is an exogenous random shock to the pricing rule. The only difference between (22) and (23) 
The purpose of these experiments was to investigate how the type of expectations feedback may affect the speed of learning of a new steady state equilibrium price, after a relatively large unanticipated shock to the economy. One may summarize these results in saying that in the positive feedback treatment individuals quickly coordinate on a common prediction, but that coordination on the 
A contrarian rules (CTR) given by: 7
A trend extrapolating rule (TRE) given by:
The coefficients of the first three rules are the medians of the estimated individual linear rules in Bao et al. (2012) . The fourth rule is called an anchoring and adjustment heuristic (A&A) (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) :
The rule uses a time varying anchor, 0.5(p av t + p t ), which is the average of the last price and the sample mean of all past prices, and extrapolates the last price change p t − p t−1 . Because of its flexible time-varying anchor, the A&A rule was successful in explaining persistent oscillations in asset pricing experiments (Anufriev and Hommes, 2012) .
Subjects switch between these rules depending upon their relative performance.
The performance of heuristic h, h ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is measured by the squared prediction error 8 : down price oscillation characteristic for negative feedback markets. 8 The participants in the experiment were also paid according to the quadratic prediction errors. and n h,t is the fraction of the agents using heuristic h in the whole population. The parameter η ∈ [0, 1] shows the relative weight the agents give to past errors compared to the most recent one. When η = 0, only the most recent performance is taken into account, and when η > 0, all past errors matter for the performance.
The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] reflects the inertia with which participants stick to their rule. When δ = 1, the agents simply do not update. When δ > 0, each period a fraction of 1 − δ participants updates their weights. The parameter β ≥ 0 represents the "sensitivity" to switch to another strategy. The higher the β, the faster the participants switch to more successful rules in the recent previous periods. When β = 0, the agents will put equal weight on each rule. When β = +∞, all agents who update switch to the most successful rule. tive feedback quite nicely and provides an intuitive, behavioral explanation why these different aggregate patterns occur. In the negative feedback market, trend following strategies perform poorly and the contrarian strategy quickly dominates the market (more than 70% within 20 periods) enforcing quick convergence to the RE benchmark after each large shock. In contrast, in the positive feedback treatment, the trend following strategy performs well and dominates the market (with more than 50% trend-followers after 10 periods). The survival of trend following strategies in the positive feedback markets causes persistent deviations from the RE steady states, overreaction and persistent price fluctuations.
The difference in aggregate behavior in these experiments is thus explained by the fact that trend-following rules are successful in a positive feedback environment amplifying price oscillations and persistent deviations from the rational equilibrium benchmark price, while the same trend-following rules are driven out by the contrarian rule in the case of negative feedback. Coordination of individual expectations on trend-following rules and almost self-fulfilling equilibria in a positive expectations feedback environment has a large aggregate effect with realized market prices deviating significantly from the perfectly self-fulfilling RE benchmark.
Conclusions
Behaviorally rational expectations are characterized by an intuitive, plausible and easily observable form of consistency between forecasts and market realizations. Behaviorally rational expectations are almost, but not necessarily exactly, self-fulfilling.
Parsimony is an important and attractive feature of behavioral rationality as simplicity makes coordination on an almost self-fulfilling equilibrium more likely as a description of aggregate macro behavior. Agents make mistakes, as their beliefs are only an approximation of complex reality. But in equilibrium, the mistake becomes self-fulfilling and it is not easy for agents to improve upon their individual forecasting.
We have presented a simple theoretical case study -a first-order consistent expectations equilibrium in a macro NKPC-, an empirical case study -a 2-type asset pricing model with (almost) self-fulfilling bubbles and crashes amplified by agents' switching between mean-reverting and trend-following beliefs-, and an experimental case-study -positive and negative feedback experiments. Positive expectations feedback is a common feature of these case-studies, leading to coordination of individual expectations on almost self-fulfilling equilibria very different from exactly self-fulfilling equilibria.
A simple and intuitive behavioral heuristics switching model explains these data well both at the micro and macro level.
